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Abstract—Mission-critical wireless networks are being up-
graded to 4G long-term evolution (LTE). As opposed to capacity, 
these networks require very high reliability and security as well as 
easy deployment and operation in the field. Wireless communica-
tion systems have been vulnerable to jamming, spoofing and other 
radio frequency attacks since the early days of analog systems. Alt-
hough wireless systems have evolved, important security and relia-
bility concerns still exist. This paper presents our methodology and 
results for testing 4G LTE operating in harsh signaling environ-
ments. We use software-defined radio technology and open-source 
software to develop a fully configurable protocol-aware interfer-
ence waveform. We define several test cases that target the entire 
LTE signal or part of it to evaluate the performance of a mission-
critical production LTE system. Our experimental results show 
that synchronization signal interference in LTE causes significant 
throughput degradation at low interference power. By dynami-
cally evaluating the performance measurement counters, the k- 
nearest neighbor classification method can detect the specific RF 
signaling attack to aid in effective mitigation. 
Keywords—Long-term evolution; mission-critical networks; 
jamming; spoofing; software-defined radio; testbed; testing. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless infrastructure and technology add to the well-being 
of society by providing communications and multimedia ser-
vices at an affordable cost. While the commercial sector contin-
ues to expand its service diversity, mission-critical networks 
and, in particular, public safety and military networks are look-
ing to leverage advances in cellular technology and fully adopt 
the 4G long-term evolution (LTE) protocol. 
Public safety units use wireless communication to effec-
tively coordinate and provide assistance in time [1]. National se-
curity relies on sensors and wireless communications to effi-
ciently assess and quickly respond to potential threats. The in-
creasing number of unmanned vehicles poses more stress on re-
liable radio communications, where even a partial breakdown 
can have catastrophic consequences. Mission-critical systems, 
moreover, need to be quickly deployable and operated in non-
ideal and even harsh signaling environments. 
Wireless communication systems have been vulnerable to 
jamming, spoofing and other attacks since the early days of an-
alog systems. Although wireless systems have evolved, im-
portant security and reliability concerns still exist. Different 
types of attacks to wireless networks have been the topic of re-
search for several years [2] [3]. 
Lazos et al. [4] address the problem of control channel jam-
ming in multi-channel ad-hoc networks and proposes a random-
ized distributed channel establishment scheme that allows 
nodes to select a new control channel using frequency hopping. 
Bicakci et al. [5] target practical hardware, software, and firm-
ware solutions for 802.11 devices to efficiently combat Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks. Chiang et al. [6] introduce a code-tree 
system for circumventing jamming signals. He et al. [7] show 
that controlled node mobility can be exploited for increasing the 
resilience against jamming. 
References [8]–[11] investigate different types of RF attacks 
on LTE networks. Since LTE is an open standard, an adversary 
can generate a protocol-aware attack, where the interfering sig-
nal can be overlaid over a specific LTE physical channel to de-
grade the system performance at low profile. These papers con-
clude that relatively little energy is needed for causing major 
system performance degradation. Labib et al. [12] coin the term 
LTE control channel spoofing, which refers to transmitting the 
LTE synchronization signals or a partial LTE downlink (DL) 
control frame from a fake eNodeB (eNB). The experimental re-
sults show that this type of attack can cause DoS. 
This paper analyzes the vulnerabilities of a mission-critical 
LTE system. We introduce a software-defined radio testbed and 
methodology for evaluating the impact of intentional RF inter-
ference on a production LTE network that is meant for mission-
critical deployment. We provide experimental results to com-
pare the effect of protocol-aware and unaware interference on 
LTE system performance. We conclude that interfering with 
LTE synchronization signals considerable degrades throughput 
with relatively low interference power. We also a method for 
protocol-aware interference detection based on k-nearest neigh-
bor classification and evaluation of performance measurement 
(PM) counters. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II presents the LTE system under test and briefly re-
views the LTE control channels. Section III introduces our 
testbed and testing methodology. Section IV provides the per-
formance results and analyses, whereas Section V illustrates the 
proposed detection mechanism. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. MISSION-CRITICAL LTE SYSTEM UNDER TEST 
The system that we analyze is a production LTE system built 
for military missions and next generation public safety trials. 
The system is embedded in a small form factor with the radio 
unit, the main unit and the power unit. The main unit features 
the Evolved Packet Core (EPC). This allows for rapid deploy-
ment in the field, needing only a power generator and an antenna 
mounted on a mast to establish a fully functional cell and offer 
LTE services. If backhaul is available, external networks can be 
accessed.  
The above mission-critical LTE system adheres to the 3GPP 
LTE Release 8 specifications. That is, it creates LTE frames us-
ing the same control channels and signals as commercial LTE 
systems. Commercial UEs can be used with this network. This 
allows leveraging competitive R&D innovations and sophisti-
cated handheld devices produced for the mass market and avail-
able at competitive prices. Note that the specifications for public 
safety LTE UEs differ from commercial UEs, allowing higher 
transmission power, among other features. The next generation 
public safety network, known as FirstNet in the US, requires 
compliance with 3GPP LTE Rel. 8 or higher. Our analysis does 
not assume any specific type of UE. We analyze the LTE net-
work performance. Our results are generalizable across 3GPP 
compliant LTE networks and UEs since we do not assume any 
specific LTE-Advanced (Rel. 10 or higher) or LTE-Pro (Rel. 12 
or higher) features. 
The LTE control channels are essential for providing the ca-
pability for the rest of the system. Without control channels and 
signals, the rest of the communication network is unusable. Pro-
tocol-aware interference can target specific physical channels. 
We briefly review some of the fundamental LTE downlink (DL) 
and uplink (UL) control channels that are relevant for the exper-
iments and analysis of this paper. These channels are available 
in all releases of LTE. Additional control channels or control in-
formation are needed for some of the more advanced LTE fea-
tures, such as carrier aggregation and use of unlicensed spec-
trum. 
Primary and Secondary Synchronization Signals 
(PSS/SSS)— The PSS/SSS need to be regularly tracked by the 
User Equipment (UE) in order to maintain synchronization with 
the eNB of the cell. 
Physical Broadcast Channel (PBCH)—The PBCH contains 
the Master Information Block (MIB) which provides details 
about the downlink bandwidth, resource length of the Hybrid 
ARQ (HARQ) Indicator Channel (PHICH), and the System 
Frame Number (SFN) to aid the UE in frame synchronization. 
The PBCH is mapped to the central 72 subcarriers of the OFDM 
symbol and is spread over four frames. It is QPSK modulated 
with a 16-bit CRC, but with an aggregate coding rate of 1/48. 
Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH)—The 
PDCCH carries critical control information, such as UE re-
source allocation, Modulation and Coding Scheme (MCS) of 
user data, information about the HARQ and precoding matrices 
for MIMO. It is QPSK-modulated with rate 1/3 convolutional 
coding. During initial cell access, it informs the UE of the first 
System Information Block (SIB1). Without the SIB1, the UE 
will be unable to complete the cell attachment process. Addi-
tionally, after cell attachment, it would be impossible for the 
UE to decode its data if the PDCCH is improperly decoded. 
Physical Control Format Indicator Channel (PCFICH)—
The PCFICH contains information regarding the size of the 
PDCCH. It contains the Control Format Indicator (CFI), which 
is 2 bits, and is encoded using a block code rate of 1/16. 
Cell-Specific Reference Signal (CRS)—The CRS are down-
link pilot symbols that are used to equalize the effects of the 
channel in order to perform coherent detection of the digitally 
modulated data symbols. CRS are QPSK-modulated and use a 
Gold sequence of length 31, which is initialized using the cell 
ID value. The CRS symbols are distributed sparsely in time and 
frequency, occupying about 5% of the REs. 
Physical Downlink Control Channel (PUCCH)—Similar as 
the PUCCH, the PDCCH is a dedicated control channel that UEs 
use to request resources and provide related control information 
to the eNB. 
Physical Downlink and Uplink Shared Channels (PDSCH 
and PUSCH)—These two channels carry the user data on the 
uplink and downlink along with certain control information, 
such as acknowledgements or negative acknowledgements. 
Note that when a user has an active data session, uplink control 
information is mapped to the PUSCH as opposed to PUCCH. 
III. LTE TESTBED AND TESTING METHODOLOGY 
A. LTE Testbed: Hardware 
Virginia Tech has built an LTE testbed using software-de-
fined radios, LTE test instruments and emulated (RFNEST) and 
real over-the-air channels [13]. The rackmount testbed has RF 
ports for attaching external RF signals. We use one of these 
ports for attaching the mission-critical LTE system and place 
the commercial UE in the shielded box. The UE operates re-
ceives and transmits over-the-air over a short distance inside the 
shielded box. The rest of the signal path goes through RF ca-
bles. Fig. 1 shows the test setup. 
PC1 generates the interference waveform. The samples are 
passed to USRP1 via the Ethernet router. USRP1 creates the RF 
signal that goes into RFNEST via an RF switch. The purpose of 
the RF switch is to enable switching between channel emulation 
(RFNEST) and antenna (not shown here, see [13] for details). 
The interference RF signal is combined with the LTE signal 
from the eNodeB in RFNEST, which allows selecting inde-
pendent gains/attenuations to obtain the desired interference to 
signal power ratio. The spectrum analyzer is used to empirically 
adjust the power levels as well as to ensure time synchroniza-
tion needed for some of the test cases. Finally the combined 
signal is passed to an antenna inside the shielded enclosure, 
 
Fig. 1. Testbed hardware (shaded blocks are used in the experiments, SA: signal 
and spectrum analyzer). 
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which also contains the UE. Note that the interferer also re-
ceived the eNB downlink signal, in particular the PSS and SSS 
for synchronized interference strategies. 
B. LTE Testbed: Software 
 The test methodology that we develop is based on testing the 
vulnerabilities of a system by analyzing the individual subsys-
tems. By targeting a specific subsystem or a specific combina-
tion of subsystems at a time, we can evaluate the system perfor-
mance and determine the weakest component in the system and 
revise it to improve the overall system robustness.  
 We propose a parametric framework for interference gener-
ation, using the same waveform as the target system. In the case 
of LTE, individual subcarriers and OFDM symbols can be tog-
gled to rapidly generate wideband, narrowband, and protocol-
aware interference over any section of the LTE signal. We used 
the open-source software library libLTE/srsLTE [16] and devel-
oped LTE protocol-aware interference waveforms that targets 
specific subcarriers and OFDM symbols. The library imple-
ments the LTE uplink and downlink waveforms and readily sup-
ports Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) SDR hardware.  
 Asynchronous Interference Waveforms—The asynchronous 
interference waveform generates interference on specific sub-
carriers. This type of interference can be of certain duration or 
continuous or discontinuous in time.  We can use this setup to 
generate any interference to LTE that does not need time align-
ment with the LTE frame. In particular, we use it for generating 
full-band, partial-band, and Physical Uplink Control Channel 
(PUCCH) interference, but can also generate a bogus PSS and/or 
SSS signal (PSS/SSS spoofing) by replacing OFDM symbols 
with synchronization sequences. An example, a 1.4 MHz inter-
ference waveform with three blocks of active subcarriers is 
shown in Fig. 2. 
 Synchronous Interference Waveforms—Transmitting on top 
of specific physical channels on the downlink requires synchro-
nization with the network to determine the location of the phys-
ical channels. Consequently, we use a setup where the interferer 
(1) acts as a receiver and synchronizes with the eNB, in this case, 
through LTE’s PSS and SSS, and (2) synchronously transmits 
its interference payload. A configurable timing offset can be 
specified to account for transmission and other delays. Fig. 3 il-
lustrates the synchronous interference waveform which targets 
the LTE PSS/SSS. 
C. Performance Evaluation Metrics 
In order to compare the vulnerabilities of different control 
channels, we define a uniform metric based on Interference to 
Signal power Ratio (ISR) values, control channel occupancy 
fraction in the LTE frame, and its relative power w.r.t. the data 
channels. In this regard, we define the following quantities: (a) 
Interference to Signal Ratio per Resource Element (𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸), (b) 
Interference to Signal Ratio per Frame (𝐼𝑆𝑅𝐹), and (c) Interfer-
ence to Signal Ratio per Target Signal (𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑁). 
Interference to Signal Ratio per Resource Element—𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸 
is defined as the ratio of the interference signal power to that of 
the LTE signal, assuming that all the Resource Elements (REs) 
have the same transmit power. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Asynchronous interference waveform generation. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3. Partial LTE DL signal which, for illustration purposes, consist of the 
PSS/SSS, PBCH, and CRS only (a). Partial LTE DL signal with synchronous 
PSS/SSS interference (b). 
Interference to Signal Ratio per Frame—When the inter-
ferer targets a specific control channel, it occupies a specific 
fractions of the total number of REs in the LTE DL frame. To 
account for this, we define 
 
𝐼𝑆𝑅𝐹 =
𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸×𝑁𝑇,𝐹
𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡,𝐹
, 
 
where 𝑁𝑇,𝐹 denotes the number of REs targeted per frame, and 
𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡,𝐹 the total number of REs per frame. We use this metric to 
compare the effects of different interference strategies on sys-
tem performance. 
D. Test Cases 
Table I presents the test cases or interference scenarios. The 
difference between PSS/SSS spoofing and interference is the 
following: In the case of spoofing, the attacker transmits a fake, 
but  legitimate  PSS/SSS  non-synchronously  to  the  LTE  DL  
TABLE I.  TEST CASES (INTERFERENCE SCENARIOS) 
 Interference Scenario Direction Synchronous 
0 No interference - - 
1 Full-band interference  UL/DL No 
2 Half-band interference UL/DL No 
3 PUCCH interference UL No 
4 PUSCH interference UL No 
5 PSS/SSS spoofing DL No 
6 PSS/SSS interference DL Yes 
 
frame. PSS/SSS interference implies transmitting interference 
on top of the eNB’s synchronization signals. 
The interference node (PC1 with USRP1 in Fig. 1) uses the 
PSS/SSS from the eNB (LTE system under test) to synchronize 
the interference signal with the LTE frame at the UE. This is 
needed only for the test case 6. We used a 10 MHz FD-LTE 
signal in these experiments. The RF signal attenuators are elec-
tronically adjusted to achieve the desired ISR. For this we use 
RFview, the graphical user interface allowing digital control 
over all 8 signal paths of RFNEST [13]. The controlled test 
setup ensures a low-noise RF environment such that the LTE 
system performance becomes interference-limited. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
We measure the UL and DL LTE throughput using iPerf to 
quantify the impact of interference. The results are shown in 
Figures 4 and 5. 
The nominal LTE system throughput is around 12 and 8 
mega-bits per second (Mbps) on the DL and UL, respectively. 
We observe that the throughput degrades as the interference co-
vers more signal bandwidth. In other words, full-band interfer-
ence is the most severe since all resource elements are affected. 
However, from Table II we see that this is not a power-efficient 
method since it requires a higher interference power.  
PUSCH interference is the next most significant threat, but 
requires slightly less interference power, proportional to the 
span of the PUSCH w.r.t. the entire LTE system bandwidth. For 
10 MHz FD-LTE PUSCH requires about 1.24 dB less power to 
cause the same degradation as full-band interference on the UL. 
PSS/SSS spoofing does not have a significant effect on the 
throughput because, from the perspective of the receiver, the 
spoofing synchronization signals are simply asynchronous nar-
rowband signals with a low duty cycle. However, synchroniza-
tion signal spoofing impedes LTE network acquisition for UEs 
that are in the initial cell selection process, as demonstrated in 
[14] and [15]. For synchronous PSS/SSS interference, even 
with a high ISR, the interference does not cause synchroniza-
tion loss; however, there is noticeable degradation of through-
put, which proves to be a more serious and immediate threat 
than the potential loss of synchronization.  
Because of the sparsity of resource elements that the PSS 
and SSS occupy in the LTE resource grid, synchronous PSS/ 
SSS interference is a very energy-efficient interference strategy 
(Table II). PUCCH interference requires 20 times more energy 
to degrade the UL throughput just as much as PSS/SSS inter-
ference. However, the RF energy efficiency comes at the cost 
of higher complexity in the interference waveform generation 
because of tight synchronization requirements between the in-
terferer and the UE. 
TABLE II.  RELATION BETWEEN 𝐽𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸 AND 𝐽𝑆𝑅𝐹  
Interference Scenario 
(
𝑁𝑇,𝐹
𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡,𝐹
) 
𝐼𝑆𝑅𝐹
𝐼𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸
 (dB) 
Full-band interference 100% 0 
Half-band interference 50% -3.01 
PUCCH interference 25% -6.02 
PUSCH interference 75% -1.25 
PSS/SSS spoofing 1.23% -19.1 
PSS/SSS interference 1.23% -19.1 
 
V. INTERFERENCE DETECTION 
The advantage of using mission-critical production LTE 
equipment is the ability to leverage sophisticated detection 
mechanisms to determine the presence of interference and de-
termine the type of interference. The LTE test equipment that 
we used was equipped with counters which are typically used 
to measure system performance, but can also be leveraged to 
detect abnormal RF behavior. As an example, we present the 
case of PUCCH interference detection using a k-NN classifica-
tion algorithm shown below. 
Fig. 6 shows the 2-dimensional 3-Nearest Neighbor (3-NN) 
algorithm by monitoring two PUCCH-related performance 
metrics from our production LTE equipment, which we refer to 
here as PM_Counter1 and PM_Counter2. For classifying a data 
point, we examine k=3 nearest data points surrounding it. The 
“blue cluster” in Fig. 6 denotes a classification of “Interfer-
ence”, whereas the “red cluster” denotes “No Interference”. The  
 
Fig. 4. Throughput results for ISRRE = 0 dB. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Throughput results for ISRRE = 5 dB. 
Algorithm 1: One iteration of k-NN classification 
1. Initial inputs: 
𝑁 metrics (PM Counters/ Key Performance Indicators) as fea-
ture-vector [𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐1, 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐2, … , 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑁] 
𝑛 categories of classification {𝐶1, 𝐶2, … 𝐶𝑛} 
𝑀 training samples as feature vectors: {𝑚1, … 𝑚𝑁}, with each 𝑚𝑖 
properly classified from one pf the 𝑛 possible categories. 
2. Initialize training samples: {𝑚1, … 𝑚𝑁}. 
3. Input to current iteration of algorithm: 
Data point (as feature-vector) to classify 𝑥 = [𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐1, 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐2, …, 
𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑁] 
For each 𝑚𝑖 in {𝑚1, … 𝑚𝑁} 
             Compute distance between 𝑥 and 𝑚𝑖: 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑥, 𝑚𝑖).  
4. Sort {𝑑1, … 𝑑𝑁} in order of increasing distance. 
5. Select {𝑚1
∗ , … , 𝑚𝑘
∗ } as the 𝑚𝑖’s corresponding to the 𝑘 smallest entries 
of {𝑑1, … 𝑑𝑁}. 
6. Classify 𝑥 based on majority vote: 𝑥 belongs to the 𝐶∗corresponding 
to the category that the majority of the 𝑘 training samples {𝑚1
∗ , … , 𝑚𝑘
∗ } 
belong to. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Detection of PUCCH interference with a 3-NN classification algorithm, 
using two appropriate PM counters available in the production LTE eNB. 
 
circles are dummy initialization points for the k-NN algorithm 
(may also represent training data) and the squares are actual 
data points gathered from our experiments. This example illus-
trates that k-NN is able to properly classify the given PM coun-
ter data, even though one data point deviates from the center of 
the pre-classified initialization points. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analyzed a mission-critical LTE system oper-
ating in a harsh signaling environment. The results have shown 
that PSS/SSS interference is a major threat to LTE performance 
after the UE attaches to a cell, and that full-band/half-band and 
PUSCH interference cause the most severe throughput degrada-
tion, but at the cost of higher power. We have also developed a 
k-NN clustering method that evaluates a subset of the available 
performance measurement counters to detect the nature of inter-
ference. These results demonstrate how existing mechanisms 
can be used to detect the presence of unusual interference in the 
network. This is a crucial first step for effective deployment and 
operation of 4G networks and designing interference-aware sys-
tems on the road to 5G. No wireless system can be made 100% 
secure and, at the same time, efficient. Hence, tradeoffs will 
need to be made when developing effective interference mitiga-
tion techniques. This is an important area in R&D that can sig-
nificantly contribute to the evolution of wireless protocols to-
wards 5G and beyond. 
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